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GOOGLE BOOKS AND YOUTUBE: PRESERVING FAIR USE 




Thousands of years after the Library of Alexandria was 
destroyed, man has used technology to change the way the world 
interacts with creative works.2  In the face of constantly evolving 
technology, copyright law is experiencing a tumultuous upheaval.  In 
the past, accessing printed, audio, or visual materials required 
physical possession of an object, like a book, CD, or DVD.  Today, the 
Internet makes information instantly accessible. 
In 2004, Google—following the current trend away from a print-
based market—undertook a massive and unprecedented endeavor 
with its “Google Library Project.”3  Without first seeking copyright 
holders’ permission,4 Google created agreements with research 
libraries, scanned their print collections, and compiled a searchable 
digital library.5  Google would display a few lines of text as Internet 
search results, but not the entire book.6  To the average Internet user, 
being able to obtain the digital versions of books is highly desirable.  
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 1  GREG JARBOE, YOUTUBE AND VIDEO MARKETING: AN HOUR A DAY 20 (2d ed. 
2012). 
 2  See Beverly A. Berneman, Putting the Google Book Settlement in Perspective: Will 
Looking for a Book Ever Be the Same Again?, in UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2009 291, 
291–93 (E. Leonard Rubin et al. eds., 2009) (beginning her discussion of the Google 
Books Settlement in a historical context and analogizing the Google Books project to 
a modern-day library of Alexandria). 
 3  Gregory K. Leonard, The Proposed Google Books Settlement: Copyright, Rule 23, and 
DOJ Section 2 Enforcement, 24 ANTITRUST 26, 26 (2010), available at 
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Google_Books_Settlement_0710.pdf. 
 4  Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books Settlement, 9 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 227 (2010). 
 5  Leonard, supra note 3, at 26. 
 6  See infra Part III (explaining in greater detail the general information in this 
introductory paragraph). 
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It is convenient to search through thousands of books online, and 
without ever stepping foot into a library or bookstore.  Copyright 
holders, however, were not pleased; they brought claims of copyright 
infringement against Google.7  The parties ultimately reached a 
settlement,8 but the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York did not approve the agreement.9 
With these digital resources increasing the immediacy and ease 
of access to the everyman, copyright law is at a crossroads.  Some 
believe that the expansion of copyright law should be curtailed.10  For 
example, Professor Lawrence Lessig states that “‘[i]f technology 
creates efficient ways to charge commercial users of copyright, then 
that’s good . . . but [not if] we evolve into a permission culture, where 
every single use of music creates an obligation to pay.”11  Indeed, with 
the advent of websites like YouTube, the general public’s interaction 
with creative works has most likely increased.12  YouTube enables 
users to upload any video, copyrighted or otherwise, to the site for 
viewing by others, without a license or permission from 
rightsholders.13  From its beginnings as a personal video-sharing site, 
YouTube is now “the world’s leading video community on the 
Internet.”14  YouTube reports staggering statistics.  Each month, more 
than 800 million unique users watch videos on the site and users 
upload seventy-two hours of video per minute.15 
This massive collection of videos provides the public with 
convenient, on-demand access to video and music, but is fraught with 
legal uncertainty.  Members of the public may believe that a YouTube 
video is in the public domain16 simply because it is on the site and 
 
 7  Id. 
 8  Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement at 
2, The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:05-
cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 772. 
 9  The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669–70 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 10  John Bowe, The Music-Copyright Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010 (Magazine), 
at 5.  
 11  Id. 
 12  See Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited 
July 31, 2012). 
 13  See Using Copyrighted Material in Your Video, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/t/copyright_permissions (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 14  JARBOE, supra note 1, at 20. 
 15  Statistics, supra note 12. 
 16  The public domain is  
[t]he universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected 
by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to 
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available online.17  Thus, these individuals might believe that they can 
use the online content as they wish.18  The doctrine of fair use 
complicates the matter.  Fair use creates an exception to general 
copyright principles and allows the use of copyrighted material, in 
certain circumstances, to further the policy purposes of “public 
discourse and education[].”19  YouTube users’ rampant uploads of 
copyrighted material prompted Viacom’s March 2007 lawsuit,20 in 
which the rightsholder asserted direct and indirect infringement21 
claims against the website.22  The key issue in the case was the 
statutory interpretation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) of 1998’s safe harbor for service providers, codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).23  The court determined that 
YouTube needed “actual or constructive knowledge of specific and 
identifiable infringements of individual items” to be held liable, 
instead of a “general awareness” of the presence of infringing 
 
use without charge.  When copyright, trademark, patent, or trade-
secret rights are lost or expire, the intellectual property they had 
protected becomes part of the public domain and can be appropriated 
by anyone without liability for infringement. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (9th ed. 2009). 
 17  See Elizabeth Towsend Gard, Conversations with Renowned Professors on the Future 
of Copyright, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35, 68 (2009). 
 18  See id. 
 19  Bruce E. H. Johnson & Maya Yamazaki, Copyright and the Internet, in 
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2010 637, 639 (E. Leonard Rubin et al. eds., 2010). 
 20  Complaint at 1, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 07 Civ. 2103, 07 Civ. 3582). 
 21  To state a claim “of direct infringement: (1) [an individual] must show 
ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that the 
alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders 
under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th 
Cir. 2001).  Contributory copyright infringement occurs when “one who, with 
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another. . . .”  Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).  Vicarious liability 
can be found where the defendant “has the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.”  Id. at 
1022 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 
1996)).  
 22  First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages 
and Demand for Jury Trial at 19–28, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 
2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 07 Civ. 2103, 07 Civ. 3582) [hereinafter First Amended 
Complaint]. 
 23  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the 
federal statutory safe harbor. 
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content.24  If similar litigation arises in the future, there could be a 
different and fairer resolution. 
This Comment will argue that YouTube’s current methods of 
handling potentially infringing content are insufficient and that an 
ultimate resolution of copyright claims against YouTube might 
include a settlement of future litigation that establishes a private body 
to make fair use determinations of copyrighted work.  Part II of this 
Comment presents an overview of the sources of copyright law, 
including the fair use exception, interpretive case law, and the 
DMCA.  Part III presents background information about the Google 
Books litigation, a general overview of the terms of the failed Google 
Books Settlement, and examples of other settlements of mass torts.  
Part IV discusses the main YouTube copyright infringement case, 
Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,25 from the Southern District 
of New York, and methods that YouTube and the rightsholders have 
used to deal with use of copyrighted material.  Part V presents the 
potential application of a settlement-based analog to the Book Rights 
Registry26 in the YouTube context. 
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. Background 
 Copyright law is rooted in the Constitution’s Patent and 
Copyright Clause that grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”27  The Copyright Act of 1976 defines copyright 
protection today.28  Enacted pursuant to the constitutional provision, 
the Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”29  Copyright, 
however, does not protect the underlying idea or concept expressed 
in the creative work.30  The Act gives the copyright holder the 
 
 24  YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523. 
 25  718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 26  See infra Part III.B for a description of the Book Rights Registry.   
 27  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 28  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006). 
 29  § 102(a). 
 30  See § 102(b). 
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exclusive right to reproduce his work, to create “derivative works” 
based upon it, to distribute it through multiple different methods, to 
stage a performance of the work (if applicable), to display it to the 
public, and to perform the work through digital audio transmission.31  
Although these copyright principles may seem basic in the abstract, 
the doctrine of fair use significantly complicates the matter. 
B. Fair Use 
1. An Overview of the Statutory Fair Use Factors 
The general right to copyright is subject to a very important 
exception—the doctrine of fair use.  The Copyright Act of 1976 
provides that use of a copyrighted work in certain instances is a 
permissible, non-infringing fair use;32 examples include “criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research.”33  To determine whether a 
use falls under this exception, courts consider four factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.34 
Because Congress foresaw that new technology would alter the 
definition of fair use, it left the statute open to judicial interpretation, 
allowing the law to develop through individual cases and specific sets 
of facts.35  As the legislative history reveals, “[t]he bill endorses the 
purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but 
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially 
during a period of rapid technological change.”36  Additionally, the 
statute defines fair use broadly so that the courts can adapt the 
doctrine to specific sets of facts.37  Fair use analysis is an “equitable 
rule of reason,” in which courts should balance the interests of the 
 
 31  See § 106(1)–(6). 
 32  See § 107. 
 33  Id. 
 34  § 107(1)–(4). 
 35  Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 801 (2010). 
 36  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976). 
 37  Id. 
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rightsholders and the public.38 
2. Courts’ Applications of the Fair Use Factors 
Indeed, courts reach varying results when interpreting these 
four factors.  The Supreme Court has stated that when a court 
considers “the purpose and character of the use,” the key issue is 
“whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the 
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message[.]”39  Put differently, the inquiry is whether and 
to what degree  the work is “transformative.”40  The Ninth Circuit 
explains that a transformative use is one that changes copyrighted 
material or transforms the copyrighted work into a “new creation” by 
using it in a “different context.”41  The court notes that the more the 
new work transforms the copyrighted material, “the less important 
the other factors, including commercialism, become.”42 
When examining “the nature of the copyrighted work,”43 the 
Second Circuit states that courts should consider that copyright law 
protects the reasonable expectations of the rightsholder and 
creator.44  It notes that the Supreme Court had declared that 
copyright was meant to protect “creative expression for public 
dissemination.”45  The Supreme Court in fact provides guidance on 
this issue, stating that it is more likely that fair use occurs “‘in factual 
works than in fictional works,’ whereas ‘a use is less likely to be 
deemed fair when the copyrighted work is a creative product.’”46  
Thus, the more creative and expressive the work product is, the 
 
 38  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 & n.40 
(1984). 
 39  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (quoting Folsom 
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. D. Mass. 1841)). 
 40  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).  
 41  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sherriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
 42  Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Campbell, 
510 U.S. at 579). 
 43  See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(2)). 
 44  See id. (citing Leval, supra note 40, at 1122).  
 45  Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586). 
 46  A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, L.L.C., 562 F.3d 630, 640 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (internal quotation marks and 
alteration omitted)).  
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greater the degree of copyright protection it receives.47 
The third factor, “the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” requires 
examination of both quantitative and qualitative factors.48  The 
Fourth Circuit notes that the greater the amount of copyrighted 
material used, the less likely the use is a fair one.49  The court 
emphasizes, however, that examination of the quantity is not the end 
of the inquiry.50  Courts must also consider the copyrighted material’s 
“quality and importance.”51  In other words, they must consider 
whether the material was “the heart of the copyrighted work.”52  Thus, 
the amount of legal reproduction of a copyrighted work depends on 
“the purpose and character of the use.”53 
Finally, the Supreme Court has characterized the fourth factor, 
“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work,” as the “single most important element of fair 
use.”54  This is the case because copyright law’s main purpose is to 
allow creators to reap the rewards of their labor and thereby 
encourage creativity.55  Thus, it is not necessary to prohibit uses that 
do not affect “the potential market for, or value of” the copyrighted 
material.56  Therefore, courts must “determine whether the 
defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ works ‘would materially impair the 
marketability of the work[s] and whether it would act as a market 
substitute’ for them.”57  As discussed later, the DMCA and the 
technology that YouTube uses to comply with the statute 
inadequately address this fair use exception.58 
These fair use provisions have been applied in major Supreme 
Court cases addressing new technologies that had similarly disruptive 
effects in markets for creative products.  In Sony Corp. of America v. 
 
 47  Id. at 640 (quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
 48  Id. at 642 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587). 
 49  Id. (quoting Bond, 317 F.3d at 396). 
 50  Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587). 
 51  Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587) (internal quotation marks and 
omitted).  
 52  iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 642 (citing Sundeman v. The Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 
F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 53  Id. 
 54  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985). 
 55  iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 642 (quoting Leval, supra note 40, at 1124).  
 56  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984). 
 57  iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 643 (quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 
2003)). 
 58  See infra Parts II.C, III.B. 
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Universal City Studios, Inc., Universal, Walt Disney, and other 
rightsholders sued Sony for copyright infringement.59  Sony 
manufactured Betamax video tape recorders, which are devices used 
by the public to record television broadcasts of Universal’s 
copyrighted works.60  Universal sought monetary relief, equitable 
accounting of profits, and an injunction against the production and 
marketing of the tape recorders.61  The issue was whether the sale of 
these tape recorders violated any of Universal’s rights as a copyright 
holder.62 
Significantly, the district court found that the average owner of 
the tape recorder engages in “time-shifting,” the term used to 
describe recording a program when it is aired in order to watch the 
program later.63  Time shifting actually increased the number of 
people who viewed the program, so this was favorable to the 
rightsholders of the content.64  Rightsholders who objected to this 
practice could not demonstrate “impair[ment] . . . [of] the 
commercial value of their copyrights or . . . cre[ation of] any 
likelihood of future harm.”65  The Supreme Court concluded that this 
constituted fair use of the copyrighted material.66 
As to the first fair use factor, “the commercial or nonprofit 
character of an activity,” the Court pointed to the district court’s 
finding that time shifting for use in the home was a “noncommercial, 
nonprofit activity.”67  Analyzing the second factor, “the nature of the 
copyrighted work,” in conjunction with the third factor, “the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole,” the Court noted that the viewer had already been 
given the opportunity to view the work for free because it was 
broadcast on television.68  Thus, the Court held that copying the 
entire work did not weigh against a finding of fair use.69 
When discussing the fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon 
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” the Court 
 
 59  Sony, 464 U.S. at 420. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. at 423. 
 64  Id. at 443. 
 65  Sony, 464 U.S. at 421. 
 66  Id. at 455. 
 67  Id. at 449. 
 68  Id.  
 69  See id. at 450. 
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observed that copyright law incentivizes an individual to engage in 
creative activity.70  The Court noted, however, that a use that does not 
affect the “market for, or value of, the copyrighted work” does not 
need to be made illegal, because individuals still have the same 
incentive to create new works after such a use.71  Thus, the Court 
explained, to challenge a noncommercial use, the proponent must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “some 
meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.”72 
In Sony, the Court held that the respondents did not 
demonstrate that time-shifting created this meaningful likelihood of 
future harm.73  It ruled that the district court’s factual findings amply 
supported a fair use determination.74  The district court found that 
the rightsholders did not show potential future harm, rejecting their 
numerous contentions.75  The court rejected claims (1) that time-
shifting viewers were not counted in viewership, decreasing revenues 
and ratings, because technology accounts for these viewers; (2) that 
live viewership will decrease as audiences watch taped programs 
because there were no facts to support the assertion; (3) that time-
shifting will decrease the amount of people who watch reruns 
because time-shifting “should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them”; 
and (4) that box office sales and rental revenue would decrease 
because there was no merit to the assertion.76  Finally, no actual harm 
had been suffered.77 
The Sony case provided the backdrop for the Ninth Circuit’s fair 
use analysis in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.78  In Napster, 
rightsholders in the recording industry sued Napster for contributory 
and vicarious copyright infringement.79  Napster allowed users to 
search for MP3 files located in the files of other computers connected 
to the Napster network.80  After locating the desired music, users 
could download a copy of the MP3 and share the music “peer-to-
 
 70  Id. 
 71  Sony, 464 U.S. at 450. 
 72  Id. at 451 (emphasis in original). 
 73  Id. 
 74  See id. at 451–55. 
 75  Id. at 452–53. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Sony, 464 U.S. at 454. 
 78  239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 79  Id. at 1011. 
 80  Id. at 1012. 
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peer.”81  Rightsholders claimed that Napster users engaged in direct 
copyright infringement by copying and distributing an MP3.82 
Napster, however, claimed that its activity was fair use.83  The 
Ninth Circuit, examining the district court’s findings for clear error,84 
concluded that the lower court did not err when it found that 
Napster users’ actions were not fair use.85  When examining the 
purpose and character of the use, the district court found that 
downloading an MP3 is a non-transformative commercial use.86  The 
district court found a commercial use because sending an MP3 to 
another cannot be a personal use and because recipients of the files 
were able to obtain the MP3 without purchasing them.87  The Ninth 
Circuit found no clear error in the lower court’s holdings.88 
Next, when analyzing the nature of the use, the Ninth Circuit 
found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the 
files were “creative in nature . . . which cuts against a finding of fair 
use . . . .”89  The court then considered the district court’s analysis of 
the third factor, the portion of the work used.90  The district court 
determined that there was “wholesale copying” of copyrighted 
material because the MP3 files must be copied in order to be 
transferred.91  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Sony case, stating 
that “under certain circumstances, a court will conclude that a use is 
fair even when the protected work is copied in its entirety.”92  Here, 
however, the court agreed with the district court’s finding that 
copying mitigated against finding fair use.93Finally, in analyzing the 
 
 81  Id.  Peer-to-peer music sharing allows users with the same or similar file 
sharing programs to create a network of computers and share files with other users 
on that network.  Fed. Trade Comm’n, Peer-to-Peer Filing Sharing: A Guide for Business, 
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION BUSINESS CENTER, 
http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus46-peer-peer-file-sharing-guide-
business#Whatis (last visited Apr. 10, 2012). 
 82  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013. 
 83  See id. at 1014–19.   
 84  Id. at 1015. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015. 
 89  Id. at 1016 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster. Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913 
(N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 90  Id., 239 F.3d at 1016. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 
(1984)). 
 93  Id. 
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“effect of the use on the market,” the district court found that 
Napster hurts the market by reducing college-student CD purchases 
and hinders the rightsholders’ entry in to the digital-music market.94 
Napster contended that the district court erred by not deeming 
sampling95 and space-shifting fair uses.96  For purposes of this 
Comment and in light of the Sony case, the more relevant of these 
uses is space-shifting, which “occurs when a Napster user downloads 
MP3 music files in order to listen to music he already owns on audio 
CD.”97  Napster pointed to Sony, claiming that the Supreme Court had 
previously held that space-shifting is fair use.98  The Ninth Circuit, 
however, held that the district court erred when it decided that Sony 
did not control.99  The court explained that “the methods of shifting 
in these cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the 
copyrighted material to the general public; the time or space-shifting 
of copyrighted material exposed the material only to the original 
user.”100  The Ninth Circuit emphasized that in Sony the Supreme 
Court noted that the copyrighted recorded materials were for 
personal use and not shared with members of the public.101 
C. New Technology: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
As the previous section illustrates, applying existing law to new 
technology is a difficult endeavor.  Congress responded to this 
complex situation with legislation by passing the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998 and extending copyright protection to 
Internet material.102  The DMCA’s purpose was “to make digital 
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted 
materials.”103  While protecting copyrighted works and explaining 
service providers’ liability, the DMCA allows the emerging market for 
these works to develop and allows for Internet access to creative 
 
 94  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016. 
 95  Sampling occurs when “users make temporary copies of a work before 
purchasing” it.  Id. at 1014. 
 96  Id. at 1017. 
 97  Id. at 1018. 
 98  Id.  Napster also cited Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia 
Sys, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999), to support its claim.  Id. at 1019. 
 99  Id. at 1019. 
 100  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Johnson & Yamazaki, supra note 19, at 639. 
 103  S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006)). 
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works.104  A statutory safe harbor for Internet service providers is built 
into the DMCA so that in certain cases, the providers can avoid 
liability.105  In order to invoke its protection, “a service provider must 
reasonably implement a system that terminates accounts of repeat 
infringers.”106  The procedure must: (1) not obstruct “standard 
technical measures” that copyright owners use “to identify or protect” 
their works; (2) be the product of collaboration between 
rightsholders and service providers; (3) be available to parties who 
need it; and (4) not be substantially costly or burdensome to the 
service providers.107  This means that the procedures the service 
providers implement must be a product of a compromise between 
the service providers and the rightsholders. 
A frequently litigated issue is whether another safe harbor, set 
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), applies.108  This provision is referred to as 
the “notice and take down provision.”109  The provision allows service 
providers to avoid liability when they store information uploaded by 
users.110  To invoke this protection, the service provider must meet 
certain qualifications.  It must “not have actual knowledge” that 
material or an activity is infringing a copyright111 and also must not 
know of “facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent.”112  Alternatively, if the service provider becomes aware of 
the infringing material on the site, it must “expeditiously” remove or 
prevent access to the content.113  The provider must not profit from 
 
 104  See id. 
 105  17 U.S.C. § 512.  A “service provider” is “a provider of online services or 
network access, or the operator of facilities therefor[,]” which includes an “entity 
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online 
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the 
user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or 
received.”  § 512(k)(1)(B).  This statute is at the core of Viacom International, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), where the court concluded that 
YouTube qualified for this safe harbor.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 106  Johnson & Yamazaki, supra note 19, at 641 (citing § 512(i)). 
 107  § 512(i)(2). 
 108  See Johnson & Yamazaki, supra note 19, at 641 (citing cases analyzing whether 
the safe harbor applies).   
 109  Lateef Mtima, Whom the Gods Would Destroy: Why Congress Prioritized Copyright 
Protection Over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61 
RUTGERS L. REV. 627, 655–56 (2009) (citing Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. 
Verizon Internet Serv., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). 
 110  § 512(c)(1). 
 111  § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 112  § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 113  § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
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the infringement.114  Finally, if the service provider is notified of 
infringing material on the site, it must remove the material.115  The 
service provider must appoint a “designated agent” must be 
appointed to handle infringement notifications, and his contact 
information must be available online and at the Copyright Office.116 
Courts have interpreted the safe harbor and applied it to many 
situations.  In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC,117 the defendants were web 
hosts that posted pictures, stolen by others, from the plaintiff’s 
website.118  The plaintiff, who was “the publisher of an adult 
entertainment magazine and the owner of” an adult website,119 
argued that usage of site names like “illegal.net” were red flags that 
signified infringing use.120  The Ninth Circuit refused to place the 
burden on the service provider to determine if pictures on their 
server were illegal.121  Similarly, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh 
Networks, Inc.,122 the Central District of California stated that if a 
service provider needed to investigate whether its website contained 
infringing material, then its minimal knowledge did not rise to the 
level of a red flag.123  In Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,124 the Western 
District of Washington stated that “‘[t]he issue is not whether 
Amazon had a general awareness [but rather] . . . whether Amazon 
actually knew that specific . . . vendors were selling items that 
infringed Corbis copyrights.”125 
The recent trademark case, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,126 is also 
analogous to the cases discussed above.  The issue in that case was 
whether eBay was liable for contributory trademark infringement.127  
The court considered whether eBay knew or had reason to know that 
sellers were infringing Tiffany’s trademark by selling counterfeit 
 
 114  § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 115  § 512(c)(1)(C).  The notification requirements are set forth in § 512(3).   
 116  See § 512(c)(2).  
 117  488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 118  Id. at 1108. 
 119  Id. 
 120  Id. at 1114.   
 121  Id. 
 122  665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009).  
 123  Id. at 1108. 
 124  351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004).  
 125  Id. at 1108. 
 126  600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 127  Id. at 97–98; see Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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goods while still allowing the sellers to use the site.128  The district 
court found that eBay had generalized notice of users who sold 
counterfeit goods but dismissed the case, holding that general 
knowledge was not enough to “impose upon eBay an affirmative duty 
to remedy the problem.”129  The Second Circuit agreed, requiring 
“knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe 
in the future” for a service provider to be liable for contributory 
trademark infringement.130  Although this was a trademark case, in 
both the YouTube and Tiffany cases, there was evidence that much of 
the material on each site was illegal—either infringing video or audio 
on YouTube or counterfeit Tiffany merchandise on eBay.131  The 
Second Circuit noted that the service providers’ duties under the 
DCMA are analogous to those in the trademark infringement 
context.132  That statute requires removal of infringing material only 
when the owner identifies such material; however, “general 
knowledge” of infringement occurring on the site “does not impose a 
duty on the service provider to monitor or search its service for 
infringements.”133  These cases indicate that the service provider, even 
when generally aware of a large amount of infringing activity, is not 
required to locate individual instances of infringement and remove 
the infringing content from its service.134 
D. Looking to the Future 
Some commentators argue that copyright law requires large-
scale reform.135  Professor Pamela Samuelson, for example, desires to 
use the experience gained since 1976 to make a broad change to the 
copyright law and adapt it to new technologies to protect purely 
digital works and industries.136  The process would take many years of 
preparation, however, before Congress could even be asked to 
 
 128  Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 97–98; see YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
 129  Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107 (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 
463, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
 130  Id.  
 131  See YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 132  Id. (quoting Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 97–98). 
 133  Id. 
 134  See YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524–25.  
 135  See e.g., Warren B. Chik, Paying It Forward: The Case for a Specific Statutory 
Limitation on Exclusive Rights for User-Generated Content Under Copyright Law, 11 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 240 (2011); Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use 
and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2005); Pamela 
Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551 (2007). 
 136  Samuelson, supra note 135, at 555. 
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legislate.137  Therefore, this type of reform may be years in the 
future.138  Samuelson predicts that neither the Copyright Office nor 
Congress will take action in the next decade.139  She believes that the 
United States is facing more serious problems, like global conflict, 
climate change, and more pressing reforms of tax and immigration 
law.140 
In addition, the industries that are protected under the current 
law are not entirely dissatisfied with the existing framework.141  
Importantly, those dealing with copyrights—for example artists, 
businesspeople, or attorneys—are familiar with the system and may 
fear being subject to a new regime.142  Individuals with the most 
influence over potential copyright legislation would likely not want to 
change the current law, as they would be averse to establishing a new 
system that could displace their advantage and shift the balance of 
power.143  Finally, to modify the Copyright Act of 1976 would cost 
both time and money and would require policymakers to address 
controversial issues, much like those grappled with during the 
legislative process leading up to the DMCA.144 
III. GOOGLE BOOKS AND THE FAILED SETTLEMENT 
A. The Google Books Controversy 
Though the court did not approve the proposed settlement that 
followed the Google Books litigation, a single provision of the 
settlement could provide a model for the resolution of copyright 
claims in the YouTube context.  In order to understand this proposed 
settlement, it is necessary to first explain the Google Books Search, 
 
 137  Id. at 556.  Samuelson explained that  
a copyright reform project focused on revision of the 1976 Act would 
require a considerable investment of effort from many people, would 
cost a good deal of money, and would bring to the surface many highly 
contentious issues, such as those that manifested themselves in the 
legislative struggles that led to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 
1998.  Even modest reform efforts . . . have encountered difficulties in 
reaching consensus.   
Id. 
 138  Id. 
 139  Id. 
 140  Id. 
 141  Id.  
 142  Samuelson, supra note 135, at 556. 
 143  Id. 
 144  Id. 
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the litigation that resulted, and the main provisions of the failed 
settlement agreement. 
As mentioned in Part I, Google scanned the collections of major 
research libraries, which prompted copyright holders to file suit in 
the Southern District of New York.145  Two actions were originally filed 
in 2005146: a class action brought on September 20 by The Authors 
Guild and other authors on behalf of those whose books were in the 
University of Michigan’s library, and another suit brought on 
October 19 by five book publishers.147  The cases were consolidated.148  
The plaintiffs claimed that Google infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights by 
scanning the full text of millions of copyrighted books and creating a 
database of searchable digital books without rightsholders’ 
permission.149  Through Google’s search engine, users could enter 
relevant information, like title or author, and search results would 
include “snippets” of the scanned books.150  Before the court could 
rule on the merits, however, the parties reached a settlement 
agreement in October 2008,151 and the court granted preliminary 
approval of the proposed amended settlement in November 2009.152 
Some commentators saw the case as an important tool for 
clarifying fair use in digital technologies.153  As noted in Part II.B, fair 
 
 145  Band, supra note 4, at 234. 
 146  Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: The Proposed Google  
Book Settlement Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Peters090910.pdf.  
 147  Band, supra note 4, at 234.  The Authors Guild describes itself as “the nation’s 
leading advocate for writers’ interests in effective copyright protection, fair contracts 
and free expression . . .  [providing] legal assistance and a broad range of web 
services to its members.”  ABOUT: HISTORY OF THE AUTHORS GUILD, 
http://www.authorsguild.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).   
 148  Band, supra note 4, at 234. 
 149  Id. at 227. 
 150  Id. at 231–32.   
 151  Press Release, Google, Authors, Publishers, and Google Reach Landmark 
Settlement: Copyright Accord Would Make Millions More Books Available Online, 
GOOGLE.COM (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel 
/20081027_booksearchagreement.html.  
 152  Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement at 
2, The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:05-
cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 772. 
 153  MICHAEL M. LAFEBER & LINDSEY D. SAUNDERS, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE: GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT AND BEYOND, ABA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ROUNDTABLE 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees 
/intellectual/roundtables/1108_outline.pdf. 
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use is doctrinally unclear,154 and with such high stakes involved in 
litigation, like costs and damages, guidelines for digital technology 
have not been established by courts through cases.155  Because Google 
had the financial capability to litigate such a case and was willing to 
take risks, the potential for a judicial resolution to the fair use issue 
was promising.156 
B. The Proposed Settlement 
As Allan Adler, vice president of the Association of American 
Publishers, remarked: 
[T]his proposed settlement is really unprecedented in its 
scope and nature . . . .  [W]hat we have here is not only a 
settlement agreement that will resolve the pending 
litigation, but it’s designed deliberately to establish and 
create a going forward model for publishers and authors 
and other rightsholders in books to work with one of the 
giants of the online world to move books online for 
purposes of providing access to a new readership.157 
The expansiveness of the settlement is related to the certified 
class in the litigation, which includes “all persons and entities that, as 
of January 5, 2009, own a U.S. copyright interest in one or more 
Books or Inserts that are ‘implicated by a use’ authorized by the 
Amended Settlement.”158  A person owns a copyright “implicated by a 
use” if Google will be using the book in its book search.159 
Correspondingly, the proposed settlement was complex and 
comprised of many detailed parts.  An in-depth description is beyond 
the scope of this Comment; a brief overview, however, is needed to 
give context to the provision of the settlement that would have 
created the Book Rights Registry.160  Generally, Google could still 
have both displayed portions of protected material and continued to 
 
 154  Id. 
 155  Id. 
 156  Id. 
 157  Objection of Scott E. Gant to Proposed Settlement, and to Certification of the 
Proposed Settlement Class and Sub-Classes at 8, The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:05-cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 143 
(alterations in original) (quoting Allan Adler, Vice President of the Association of 
American Publishers).  
 158  FAQs, GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT, http://www.googlebooksettlement.com 
/help/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=118704#q2 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) 
[hereinafter FAQs]. 
 159  Id. 
 160  See infra Part III.C (discussing the Book Rights Registry in greater detail). 
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copy more books from those libraries that offered their collections.161  
The Book Rights Registry would have recorded generated revenue 
and, in turn, would have paid the rightsholders.162  Entities like 
libraries or schools could have purchased subscriptions to the entire 
database of scanned books for use by their patrons or students.163  
Further, a rightsholder could create a licensing agreement with other 
companies, even if his work was included in Google Books.164  
Additionally, if a rightsholder did not want to be included in the 
settlement, he could opt-out of all of the settlement’s terms, 
including the database of scanned books, the Book Rights Registry, 
and the copyright payment plan.165  Similarly, if he did not want a 
work displayed through the search or included in the collection, he 
could restrict access to it whenever he desired to do so.166 
C. The Book Rights Registry 
The Book Rights Registry would have been vital to the success of 
the settlement agreement because it would have administered the 
agreement’s provisions and acted as an intermediary between 
rightsholders and Google.167  Google described the Book Rights 
Registry as a not-for-profit and independent organization whose sole 
purpose would have been to “locat[e] rightsholders, collect[] and 
maintain[] accurate rightsholder information, provid[e] a way for 
rightsholders to request inclusion in or exclusion from the project, 
distribut[e] payments earned from online access provided by Google, 
and represent[] rightsholders’ interests in connection with similar 
programs that may be established by other providers.”168  To receive 
payments, authors and publishers would have had to take part in the 
Book Rights Registry.169  The board of directors of the Book Rights 
Registry would have been comprised of both author and publisher 
representatives.170  The Authors Guild and the Association of 
American Publishers would have appointed these directors.171  This 
 
 161  See Hearings, supra note 146, at 4 (statement of Marybeth Peters). 
 162  Id. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id. 
 167  See FAQs, supra note 158. 
 168  FAQs, supra note 158. 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 671. 
 171  ISABEL HOWE, HOW THE AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE SETTLEMENT WILL WORK, 
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registry would not only have benefitted the Google Books Project, but 
also would have been used in similar potential projects by other 
corporations.172  Google would have paid $34.5 million to cover start-
up costs,173 and continued funding would have come from its 
revenue.174  The settlement allocated forty-five million dollars for 
payments to rightsholders, ranging from sixty dollars for a 
rightsholder of a whole book, or “principal work,” and smaller 
amounts for smaller items included within works.175 
The Google Book Search litigation illustrates the conflict 
between, on the one side, copyright holders and a print-based market 
and, on the other, new technologies and the digital age.  The 
litigation between Viacom and YouTube exposes similar tension 
among the Internet video-hosting website, the end-users who upload 
content to the site, and the rightsholders of copyrighted material on 
the website.  As discussed below, this tension cannot be easily 
resolved.176 
D. The Google Book Settlement’s Eventual Rejection 
On March 22, 2011, the Southern District of New York rejected 
the proposed settlement.177  In doing so, the court evaluated the 
proposal by applying the Grinnell factors.178  Circuit courts typically 
use these factors to determine whether a settlement is fair and, in 
turn, whether it should be approved.179  The court applied the 
Grinnell factors to determine whether the settlement was “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate” as required by Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(e).180  These factors are: 
(1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the 
litigation; 
(2) the reaction of the class to the settlement; 




visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 172  FAQs, supra note 158. 
 173  Id. 
 174  HOWE, supra note 171. 
 175  The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 176  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 177  The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 178  Id. at 674. 
 179  Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. 
REV. 35, 111 n.221 (2003). 
 180  Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 674. 
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discovery completed; 
(4) the risks of establishing liability; 
(5) the risks of establishing damages; 
(6) the risks of maintaining a class action through trial; 
(7) the ability of defendants to withstand greater judgment; 
(8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in 
light of the best possible recovery; and 
(9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in 
light of the attendant risks of litigation.181 
The court noted that most of these factors indicated that the 
settlement should be approved.182  There was extensive negotiation 
between highly competent parties and litigating the case would be 
complicated and would require a great amount of time and money.183  
The litigation had already been pending for years.184  Additionally, 
there was a high probability that the plaintiffs would lose at trial and 
that the class itself could not be maintained.185  Thus, the court 
concluded that the financial elements of the settlement were 
reasonable in light of the risks presented.186  The court stated, 
however, that the second Grinnell factor, the reaction of the class to 
the settlement, was key.187  The court explained that “[n]ot only are 
the objections great in number, some of the concerns are significant.  
Further, an extremely high number of class members—some 6800—
opted out.”188 
The court noted multiple practical problems that rendered the 
settlement impossible.  It stated that there was “a substantial question 
as to the existence of antagonistic interest between named plaintiffs 
and certain members of the class.”189  Additionally, it found the 
second part of the settlement problematic because it would “transfer 
to Google certain rights in exchange for future ongoing 
arrangements . . . and would release Google (and others) from 
liability for certain future acts.”190  The court specified that Congress—
not a private settlement agreement—should determine treatment of 
 
 181  Id. (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 182  Id. at 675. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
 185  Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 675–76. 
 186  Id. at 676. 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id.  
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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orphan works.191  Additionally, the settlement “would release claims 
well beyond those contemplated by pleadings.”192  The court noted 
that the case truly centered on claims about scanned clips of books 
and not the wholesale online availability of copyrighted books in the 
future, as contemplated by the settlement.193  The court also stated 
that the interests of the class members were not adequately 
represented because while academics favored availability of 
information, others, like the named plaintiffs The Authors Guild and 
the Association of American Publishers, did not.194  The opt-out 
provision raised significant concerns.195  The court focused on the fact 
that to avoid being covered by the settlement rightsholders would 
have to opt out; otherwise, they would lose their rights without ever 
agreeing to transfer them.196  The court asserted that rightsholders 
should not have to affirmatively protect their works after Google 
copied them without their consent.197  It also stated that the 
settlement would allow Google to dominate the search market, 
raising antitrust concerns.198  Finally, the court noted that 
international legal implications were unclear and this uncertainty was 
enough, in light of the other issues, to be problematic.199 
While the settlement in its current form has been rejected, it 
seems the greater legal implications of the opt-out provision and 
Google’s unauthorized copying activities were most problematic.  A 
settlement utilizing private ordering to determine appropriate usage 
of copyrighted works on YouTube, as discussed infra, does not have 
the broad-ranging implications of the Google Books Settlement.  
Other settlements, however, provide examples of mechanisms used to 
make binding determinations on class members. 
 
 191  Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677–78.   
Orphan works are works that are protected by copyright but for which 
a potential user cannot identify or locate the copyright owner for the 
purpose of securing permission.  They do not include works that are in 
the public domain; works for which a copyright owner is findable but 
refuses permission; or works for which no permission is necessary, i.e., 
the use is within the parameters of an exception or limitation such as 
fair use. 
Hearing, supra note 146, at 8 (statement of Marybeth Peters). 
 192  Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 678. 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id at 679–80. 
 195  Id. at 681. 
 196  Id. at 681–82. 
 197  Id. at 682. 
 198  Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682–83. 
 199  Id. 684–85. 
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D. Other Settlement Examples 
In other cases, settlements have included a private body or 
council that administers claims or makes threshold determinations 
about plaintiffs.  These bodies could serve as a model for the 
settlement if future copyright litigation arises in the YouTube 
context. 
1. Vioxx Litigation 
The ultimate resolution of the Vioxx litigation involved a 
settlement in which a committee determined claimants’ awards.200  
This litigation itself arose out of a study of the drug, entitled the 
Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research,201 or “VIGOR,” and what 
the drug’s pharmaceutical manufacturer, Merck, did after its 
release.202  Scientists at Merck voiced concerns about Vioxx’s blood 
clotting effect years before the study.203  Released in 2000, VIGOR 
revealed that patients taking Vioxx were approximately five times 
more likely to suffer a heart attack than people taking Naproxen.204  
After VIGOR was published in the New England Journal of Medicine, 
Merck did not take any investigatory action or warn doctors of the 
risk.205  Instead, the drug company resisted the FDA’s attempts to 
require a warning, continued to expand marketing of the drug, and 
purposefully downplayed any safety concerns.206  Finally, in 2004, 
another study showed that Vioxx caused an increased risk of heart 
disease and Merck removed the drug from commerce.207 
After multidistrict litigation, the parties reached a settlement.208  
Merck established a four billion dollar compensation fund for 
patients that suffered heart attacks and a $850 million dollar fund for 
those who suffered strokes.209  Plaintiffs had to enroll in a program to 
become eligible for proceeds from the fund.210  Individuals and those 
 
 200  Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Disclosure, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279 (2011). 
 201  W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it Have Ended Differently in the European 
Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 369 (2006). 
 202  Id. at 276–78. 
 203  Id. at 276. 
 204  Id. 
 205  Id. 
 206  Id. 
 207  Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 200, at 277. 
 208  Id. at 277–78. 
 209  Id. at 279. 
 210  Id. 
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suing on behalf of a decedent were required to show that they or the 
decedent suffered a heart attack or stroke and took a particular 
dosage of the drug over a certain amount of time.211 
Importantly, a “gate committee” then assessed each of the 
plaintiff’s cases to decide whether he or she was eligible to receive 
compensation.212  The committee was composed of three drug 
company representatives and three plaintiff representatives.213  After 
the threshold determination of eligibility, a claims administrator 
assigned each plaintiff a certain number of points.214  The 
administrator awarded points based on the severity of the heart attack 
or stroke and the duration of the plaintiff’s usage of the drug.215  The 
more severe the health effects and longer the plaintiff ingested 
Vioxx, the more points he or she would be given.216  Conversely, 
plaintiffs who were overweight or had a family history of heart disease 
or diabetes, and that were at a higher risk for heart attack or stroke 
were given fewer points than others.217  These point totals translated 
into dollars awarded per plaintiff.218 
2. Breast Implant Litigation 
Similarly, through the settlement process in Lindsey v. Dow 
Corning Corp., a settlement office was created to make determinations 
about claims.219  Plaintiffs injured by implantation of silicone breast 
 
 211  Id. 
 212  Id. 
 213  Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 200, at 279. 
 214  Id.  If the claims administrator denies a plaintiff eligibility, a committee 
reviews the decision.  Description of Settlement Agreement, OFFICIAL VIOXX SETTLEMENT, 
http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Description%20of 
%20Settlement.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).  If the committee agrees with the 
administrator’s determination, the plaintiff can pursue a tort claim, suffer dismissal 
of his claim after thirty days of inaction, or appeal the decision to a Special Master.  
See id.  The Special Master reviews the entire claim de novo.  Id.  If the Special Master 
also deems the plaintiff ineligible, the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed and is given no 
legal recourse.  Id.  If, however, the plaintiff wins this appeal of last resort, the claim 
proceeds.  Id.  
 215  Id. 
 216  Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 200, at 279.  
 217  Id. 
 218  See id.  To obtain the dollar value per point, the entire amount of the fund was 
divided by the total points awarded.  Id.  Each plaintiff’s total points were then 
multiplied by this dollar amount to determine how much money each would receive.  
Id. 
 219   See THE OFFICE OF THE SETTLEMENT FACILITY-DOW CORNING TRUST, CLAIMANT 
INFORMATION GUIDE: DOW CORNING BREAST IMPLANT CLAIMANTS (CLASS 5) 26 (2002), 
available at http://www.tortcomm.org/downloads/CLASS%205%20CLAIMAINT 
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implants filed suit against the manufacturer, Dow Corning.220  After 
the 1994 settlement, Dow Corning’s declaration of bankruptcy, and a 
revised settlement in 1995, the plaintiffs accepted $3.2 billion dollars 
in settlement funds in 1998.221  The settlement involved various classes 
of claimants classified according to national citizenship or residence, 
location of the implant surgery, and what type of implant received.222  
For example, members of Class 5 were the “Domestic Dow Corning 
Breast Implant Claimants.”223  These women had received a breast 
implant made by Dow Corning and were United States citizens, 
resident aliens, or had undergone surgery in the United States.224  
These plaintiffs were eligible to receive different amounts of 
compensation—a $5,000 explant payment, a $25,000 rupture 
payment, and a $2,000 expedited release payment.225 
Alternatively, the Medically Contraindicated Exception to the 
rupture payment is, as its name implies, an exception to the required 
demonstration of proof for this $25,000 payment.226  A plaintiff can 
receive this money without having her implants removed if she 
satisfies six criteria.227  The claims administrator makes the 
 
%20INFORMATION%20GUIDE.pdf [hereinafter CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE].   
 220  JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE 
CASE STUDIES 75–76 (1998), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Tidmarsh.pdf/$file/Tidmarsh.pdf. 
 221  FRONTLINE: BREAST IMPLANTS ON TRIAL, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/implants/cron.html (last visited Jan. 15, 
2011). 
 222  CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 219, at 2–3. 
 223  Id. at 3.  This group is different from those who are Disease Claimants in Class 
5, who, under the “The Disease Payment Option,” sought payments of $12,000–
$300,000.  To recover, they must submit medical records demonstrating that they 
suffer from certain enumerated diseases caused by the implants.  THE OFFICE OF THE 
SETTLEMENT FACILITY-DOW CORNING TRUST, DISEASE CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE: 
DOW CORNING BREAST IMPLANT CLAIMANTS (CLASS 5) 2–3 (2002), available at 
http://www.tortcomm.org/downloads/Disease%20CIG_ENG_5.pdf.  
 224  CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 219, at 3. 
 225  Id. at 5.  The explant payment is payment to those demonstrating that the 
implant was removed within a certain time period; the rupture payment is an 
additional payment to those demonstrating that the removed implant had ruptured; 
and the expedited release payment simply requires proof of implantation of a Dow 
Corning implant.  Id. 
 226  See id. at 26–28. 
 227  Id.  The criteria are: specific proof that Dow Corning is the manufacturer; a 
doctor’s statement and diagnosis accompanied by medical documentation of the 
“serious chronic medical condition” that makes surgical removal impossible; 
objective findings in the medical records that the Claims Administrator can use to 
make an independent determination as to “the severity of the condition and 
diagnosis;” a specific type of MRI; a rupture revealed by the MRI; and “[t]he serious 
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determination as to whether the criteria are satisfied and makes, in 
the appropriate situation, the ultimate finding of medical 
contraindication.228  After examining the required documents, the 
claims administrator may find that “removal of [the] breast implants 
is likely, in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment, to result in 
significant complications or have a significant adverse effect on [the 
claimant’s] medical condition.”229 
3. Contaminated Blood Litigation 
Like the Vioxx and breast implant litigation, the settlement of 
Walker v. Bayer Corp. also involved an extrajudicial process that 
facilitated settlement.230  This case arose out of the contamination of 
America’s blood reserves with human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV).231  Prior to 1985, approximately sixty-three to eighty-nine 
percent of those afflicted with severe hemophilia contracted HIV 
from transfusions of inadequately screened blood.232  The class 
included not only those who contracted HIV from infected blood or 
substances made from infected blood, but also their partners, 
infected children, those who claimed to suffer emotional distress due 
to a loved one’s infection, the parents or guardians of minors or 
incompetents, and representatives of deceased class members.233 
Each individual who was infected by HIV receives $100,000.234  
The settlement administrator, however, cannot make payment on the 
claim until both class counsel and the defendants reach an 
agreement as to whether the claim should be paid.235  If all parties 
agree, then the claim is paid.236  If the parties disallow the claim or 
cannot reach an agreement on its merits, then the claim is not paid; 
this decision, or lack thereof, is appealable237 to a special master who 
resolves the claim disputes.238  If the special master also disallows the 
 
chronic medical condition must be present at the time of the MRI discovery of the 
Rupture and at the time [of submission of the r]upture claim.”  See id. at 26–27.   
 228  See id. at 27. 
 229  CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 219, at 27. 
 230  TIDMARSH, supra note 222, at 95. 
 231  Id. at 91. 
 232  Id. 
 233  Id. at 92. 
 234  Id. at 93. 
 235  Id. at 95. 
 236  TIDMARSH, supra note 222, at 95.   
 237  Id. 
 238  Id. 
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claim, the claimants are excluded from the class and can sue the 
defendants individually.239 
These settlements—of mass tort suits involving pharmaceuticals, 
breast implants, and contaminated blood—provide background for 
the YouTube litigation and most importantly, the potential resolution 
of future copyright infringement claims against YouTube users 
through a similar system of private ordering.  The relevance of these 
settlements is best understood through the lens of the YouTube 
copyright infringement case.240 
IV. YOUTUBE AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
This section discusses the case Viacom International Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., in which copyright holders sued YouTube for hosting 
copyright-protected content uploaded by end-users on its on its 
website.  Next, it explores YouTube policies and how the site deals 
with the problem of copyrighted content uploaded by third parties 
and without permission from rightsholders.  Finally, this section 
contends that these policies and technologies, while useful in 
identifying copyrighted material, do not adequately allow for fair use 
of material on the site. 
A. Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. 
Viacom brought claims of direct, inducement of, contributory, 
and vicarious copyright infringement against YouTube for allowing 
and facilitating the public display, performance, reproduction, and 
distribution of its copyrighted material.241  YouTube moved for 
 
 239  Id. 
 240  Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 241  First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 25–28.  These are the four main 
types of copyright claims.  Aric S. Jacover & Christopher C. Mackey, Basic Copyright 
Enforcement, in UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2008 133, 142–44 (E. Leonard Rubin 
et al. eds., 2008).  To win on a direct infringement claim, the plaintiff must prove 
that (1) he owns a copyright and (2) one of his rights, protected under the 
Copyright Act, has been violated.  Id.  The remaining three claims involve third 
parties.  Id.  Contributory infringement consists of: “(1) direct infringement by a 
primary infringer, (2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material contribution 
to the infringement.”  Id. (citing Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 
2004)).  The three elements of vicarious infringement are: “(1) direct infringement 
by a primary party, (2) a direct financial benefit to the defendant, and (3) the right 
and ability to supervise the infringers.”  Id. at 143 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)).  Finally, in MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court held that “one who distributes a device with the 
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or 
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of 
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summary judgment, claiming that it qualified for the DMCA’s safe 
harbor provision contained in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) and was therefore 
not liable for any infringement.242  Viacom made a cross-motion for 
partial summary judgment, claiming that YouTube was not in fact 
entitled to the safe harbor’s protection.243  The court reviewed the 
safe harbor provision, discussed above.244 
The key issue in the case was a question of statutory 
interpretation.245  The court had to interpret the phrases “actual 
knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the 
system or network is infringing,” and “facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent” in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).246  
The court had to decide whether knowledge meant “general 
awareness that there are infringements,” where the plaintiff asserted 
that infringements were prevalent on the site, or whether knowledge 
meant “actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable 
infringements of individual items.”247  It looked to the legislative 
history of the DMCA, citing Senate and House Reports at length.248  
The statute states that the service provider possesses the requisite 
knowledge “by actual knowledge of infringement or . . . awareness of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”249  
Congress described the red flag test as having subjective and objective 
components.250  The first element, which is subjective, deals with the 
provider’s subjective awareness of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding infringement.251  The second part of the analysis, which 
is objective, is to determine “whether infringing activity would have 
been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or 
 
infringement by third parties.”  Id. (quoting MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 
U.S. 913, 939 n.12 (2005)). 
 242  Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
For a discussion of the safe harbor provision, see supra Part II.C. 
 243  Id. 
 244  Id.   
 245  See id. at 519. 
 246  Id. 
 247  Id. 
 248  YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519–24. 
 249  Id. at 520.  The relevant statutory provision, § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), is a “red flag 
test.”  Id.  A service provider does not have to actively patrol its service for 
infringement, but if it has knowledge of infringement, then it will not be eligible for 
the safe harbor if it does not act to eliminate or prevent access to the infringing 
material.  Id. at 520–21. 
 250  Id. at 520. 
 251  Id. 
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similar circumstances.”252 
In light of the statute itself and the relevant legislative history, 
the court concluded that the phrases in question referred to 
“knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of particular 
individual items” and that 
[m]ere knowledge of prevalence of such activity in general 
is not enough. . . .  To let knowledge of a generalized practice of 
infringement in the industry, or of a proclivity of users to 
post infringing materials, impose responsibility on service 
providers to discover which of their users’ postings infringe 
a copyright would contravene the structure and operation 
of the DMCA.253 
The court reasoned that this was the more practical solution.254  A 
service provider is unable to know whether the owner had licensed 
the user’s video, whether it was fair use of copyrighted content, or 
whether the rightsholder contested the use at all.255  The court 
pointed to the success of the current policy and cited the example of 
a mass takedown of about 100,000 videos on Viacom’s request.256  
Almost all of the identified videos were removed by the next day.257  
The court then recounted relevant case law, all of which supported its 
holding.258  These cases indicated that the service provider, even when 
generally aware of a large amount of infringing activity, is not 
required to locate individual instances of infringement and remove 
the infringing content from its service.259  The court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant rightsholders, holding that they qualified 
for the safe harbor’s protection, and denied all of the plaintiffs’ cross 
motions.260  The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s 
construction of the provision,261 but reversed its grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants.262 
 
 252  YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 520. 
 253  Id. at 523 (emphasis added). 
 254  Id. at 524. 
 255  Id. 
 256  Id. 
 257  Id. 
 258  See YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524–25.  For a discussion of the cases that the 
court cited, see supra Part II.C. 
 259  See supra Part II.C. 
 260  YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
 261  Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Nos. 10–3270–cv, 10–3342–cv, 2012 WL 
1130851, at *7 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2012). 
 262  Id. at *8–9.  The court held that there were “triable issue[s] of fact as to 
whether YouTube actually knew, or was aware of facts or circumstances that would 
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B. Current YouTube Policies and Fair Use 
YouTube employs two main technologies to indentify 
copyrighted material: AudioID and VideoID.263  Copyright holders 
can identify videos that contain all or part of their copyrighted 
works.264  Additionally, they can decide what action, if any, should be 
taken when copyrighted content is identified.265  For example, they 
can use the videos to generate revenue or to track viewing statistics, 
or they can completely remove these videos from YouTube.266  In 
addition to sending YouTube information about the content and 
providing YouTube with instructions regarding the copyrighted work, 
the rightsholder must send YouTube files of the work to be identified 
within users’ videos.267  These audio or video files serve as reference 
material so that YouTube can compare uploaded videos with 
copyrighted content.268  When copyrighted material is identified, 
YouTube automatically implements the rightsholder’s desired course 
of action.269 
YouTube states that there are numerous benefits of this 
software.270  It allows rightsholders to make money, to expand the fan 
base of their works, to prevent copyright infringement, to have an 
automated procedure in place, and to track data on the videos.271  
Currently, over one thousand rightsholders use these technologies.272  
YouTube states that these technologies allow the fair use of 
copyrighted content in YouTube videos.273  Rightsholders are able to 
create bright-line rules of their own, including “policies [that] 
depend[] on the proportion of a claimed video that contains their 
work, or the absolute length of the clip used.”274  As an example, 
YouTube describes a record label that allows users to upload videos 
 
indicate, the existence of particular instances of infringement.”  Id. 
 263  YOUTUBE AUDIOID & YOUTUBE VIDEOID, 
http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited March 18, 2012). 
 264  Id. 
 265  Id. 
 266  Id. 
 267  Id. 
 268  Id. 
 269  AUDIOID & VIDEOID, supra note 263. 
 270  Id. 
 271  Id. 
 272  Shenaz Zack, Content ID and Fair Use, BROADCASTING OURSELVES ;), THE 
OFFICIAL YOUTUBE BLOG (April 22, 2010), http://youtube-
global.blogspot.com/2010/04/content-id-and-fair-use.html. 
 273  Id. 
 274  Id. 
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with song clips of fewer than sixty seconds, but permits YouTube to 
block videos with more than one minute of a copyrighted song.275  
Nonetheless, YouTube acknowledges the limitations of this 
procedure.276  The company notes that “[r]ights holders are the only 
ones in a position to know what is and is not an authorized use of 
their content, and [it] require[s] them to enforce their policies in a 
manner that complies with the law.”277 
Users can contest removal of a video through an automated 
process, if they believe the video is a proper use of content.278  If a 
user receives a notice saying that content has been flagged via 
ContentID, then YouTube tells the user which rightsholder contests 
his use and allows the user to challenge the rightsholder’s claim.279  
To do so, the user must check a box that reads “This video uses 
copyrighted material in a manner that does not require approval of 
the copyright holder.”280  After the user objects, YouTube reposts the 
video.281  Then the rightsholder must decide whether he will file a 
DMCA notification to remove material from YouTube permanently.282  
These procedures identify copyrighted material well and allow the 
rightsholders to dictate YouTube’s course of action.  Just because a 
user posts copyrighted material does not mean that the post is illegal. 
YouTube’s policies may not adequately protect the fair use of 
copyrighted content.  The procedure requires a fair use 
determination by the rightsholder and an assessment of the video by 
the user.  While YouTube provides users with information about what 
could happen when they use copyrighted material in their videos, it 
provides scant information about what constitutes fair use.  The 
company tells users that in order to determine whether their videos 
are infringing upon copyrighted material, the users “need to analyze 
and weigh four factors that are outlined in the U.S. copyright 
statute.”283  This seems to be of little use to those outside of the legal 
profession.  As YouTube acknowledges, “the weighing of these four 
 
 275  Id. 
 276  Id. 
 277  Id. 
 278  Zack, supra note 272. 
 279  Id. 
 280  Id. 
 281  Id. 
 282  Id. 
 283  General Copyright Inquiries: Using Some Copyrighted Content in Your Videos, 
YOUTUBE HELP ARTICLES, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py 
?hl=en&answer=143457 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
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factors is often quite subjective and complex.  For this reason, it’s 
often difficult to determine whether a particular use is a ‘fair use.’”284  
Understandably, YouTube will not assess a user’s video to determine 
whether it is protected under the fair use exception, but instead 
suggests the user consult an attorney for assistance, and refers the 
user to various other informational websites.285 
Thus, Audio ID and Video ID have their limits, as they are 
technologies that can identify the underlying copyrighted work, but 
do not assess the work as a whole to decide whether it falls into the 
fair use exception.286  Two particular incidents illustrate this 
shortcoming.  During the 2008 presidential campaign, John McCain’s 
campaign requested that YouTube review the McCain team’s posted 
videos prior to responding to DMCA takedown notices and removing 
them from the website.287  According to Trevor Potter, the campaign’s 
general counsel, many of the removed McCain advertisements 
constituted fair use of portions of television footage and were thus 
non-infringing material.288  YouTube’s general counsel, Zahava 
Levine, firmly denied the request.289  She said, “[l]awyers and judges 
constantly disagree about what does and does not constitute fair-
use . . . [and n]o number of lawyers could possibly determine with a 
reasonable level of certainty whether all the videos for which we 
receive disputed takedown notices qualify as fair-use.”290  Levine stated 
that the company did not want to risk losing the DMCA safe harbor’s 
protection by failing to quickly remove the videos when a takedown 
request was received.291  She also stated that rightsholders, not 
YouTube, should bear the burden of deciding whether their video is 
protected by fair use because the determination is difficult and the 
rightsholders are better able to make such a determination.292  She 
noted that the rightsholder and the user “hold all of the relevant 
information [as to whether the video is infringing], including the 
 
 284  Id. 
 285  Id. 
 286  Fred von Lohmann, YouTube’s Content ID (C)ensorship Problem Illustrated, 
DEEPLINKS BLOG (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/youtubes-
content-id-c-ensorship-problem. 
 287  Sarah Lai Stirland, YouTube to McCain: You Made Your DMCA Bed, Lie in It, 
THREAT LEVEL: PRIVACY, CRIME, AND SECURITY ONLINE (Oct. 15, 2008, 10:25AM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/youtube-to-mcca/. 
 288  Id. 
 289  Id. 
 290  Id. 
 291  Id. 
 292  Id. 
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source of any content used, the ownership rights to the content, and 
any licensing arrangements in place between the parties.”293  If 
rightsholders do in fact think that their videos are permissible use, 
then they can issue a DMCA counter-notice and YouTube will re-post 
the videos.294 
Additionally, during December 2008 and January 2009, Warner 
Music Group sent a massive takedown notice affecting thousands of 
videos.295  Some, like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, called this a 
“fair use massacre,” as implicated videos included those using Warner 
Music’s songs as background tracks and musicians covering a 
copyrighted song while playing along with the original track.296  This 
en masse takedown was possible because of the ease and speed of the 
Content ID automated process.297 
John McCain’s well-funded and influential campaign created 
videos, uploaded them to YouTube, and yet still had problems with 
the current notice-and-takedown process because the process 
requires videos that may constitute fair use to be removed.  This 
outcome does not bode well for the average YouTube user, who may 
not be legally savvy and cannot determine whether his video is a 
candidate for a fair use defense.  Users may fear legal repercussions if 
they file an objection and the rightsholder contests the objection and 
sues.  Thus, users may avoid filing an objection, even when there is a 
high probability that their video is permissible under the fair use 
exception. 
V. TOWARDS A VIDEO AND MUSIC RIGHTS REGISTRY THROUGH 
SETTLEMENT: COULD THE BOOK RIGHTS REGISTRY BE A MODEL? 
A. Progress is Deadlocked 
It is safe to assume that a massive copyright law reform will not 
occur in the near future.  As mentioned above, the odds of reform 
taking place in the next decade are slim due to more pressing 
national concerns, like global conflict, climate change, and other 
 
 293  Stirland, supra note 287. 
 294  Id. 
 295  Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of “Platforms,” 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 3, 13 
(2010). 
 296  Fred von Lohmann, YouTube’s January Fair Use Massacre, DEEPLINKS BLOG (Feb. 
3, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/01/youtubes-january-fair-use-
massacre. 
 297  Id.  
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more urgent reforms of tax and immigration law.298  Moreover, there 
is disagreement as to whether Congress should rewrite the copyright 
law or whether judicial action, like the Google Books Settlement, is 
the proper method of change.  For example, Professor Stephen 
Jamar explains the three ways in which user-generated content could 
be protected, but he is pessimistic about the success of these 
methods.299  First, the current regime requires rightsholder 
permission for use of copyrighted work; rightsholders can simply 
deny this permission.”300  Jamar states that this is not ideal because the 
rightsholders may prevent their work from being used in any way and 
thereby effectively chill speech.301  Second, the courts can create a per 
se rule that “noncompeting, noncommercial, user-generated content 
distributed online” is fair use, while drawing on other principles—
like the fact that copyright protection does not extend to general 
storylines and characters—to encourage the growth of user-generated 
content.302  This development would be slow and inconsistent across 
the circuits.303  Third, Congress could legislate to increase the user’s 
rights.304  Jamar notes that the wealthiest and therefore most powerful 
interests desire longer copyright terms, increased protection, and 
greater enforcement.305  These interests have historically prevailed.306 
B. Potential Solutions that Work Within the System Have Limitations 
Potential solutions attempt to work within the existing system; 
there are, however, significant drawbacks.  For example, Rumblefish, 
a music licensing company, is selling licenses to copyrighted songs, 
enabling users to receive and edit an entire track of a song.307  The 
song, however, may only be used for personal videos.308  While 
purchasing a license ensures that the user is not infringing a 
copyright, as he now has express permission to use the material, there 
 
 298  Samuelson, supra note 135, at 556; see supra Part II.D. 
 299  Steven D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect User-Generated 
Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, 19 WIDENER L.J. 843, 871 (2010). 
 300  Id. 
 301  Id. 
 302  Id. 
 303  Id. 
 304  Id. at 872. 
 305  Jamar, supra note 299, at 872. 
 306  Id. 
 307  Joseph Plambeck, For $1.99, a (Legal) Song To Add to YouTube Videos, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 28, 2010, at B6.  
 308  Id. 
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could be instances where a license is not needed because the video 
falls within the fair use exception. 
Additionally, it is possible that in the future, YouTube may make 
agreements with movie studios to show copyrighted content online.  
For example, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer posted full-length television 
episodes and movies, while video pages display advertisements.309  
Although the content offered is limited, it could mark a shift in 
relationships between YouTube and Hollywood.310  Analysts have 
stated that this may signal a period of collaboration between the site 
and rightsholders.311  Nevertheless, studios still prefer Hulu—a 
website that was actually created by movie and television studios—and 
conclude that YouTube’s site layout is “too cluttered.”312  Additionally, 
YouTube was unable to come to an agreement with Warner, under 
which the studios would have received advertising revenue and 
YouTube would post some of the studio’s videos.313  Thus, while 
Hollywood shows signs of cooperating with the site, the user who 
wants to use some part of copyrighted work in his own video has little 
guidance on how to do so without running afoul of copyright law.  
Deals like this would improve the public’s ability to view the content 
online, but not its ability to manipulate the video.  Finally, 
advertisement revenue sharing allows rightsholders to profit from 
their content while not directly addressing the problem of potential 
infringement.314  YouTube emphasizes the distinct appeal of 
advertising in this context because it is personalized to the user.315  
For example, instead of removing a video of a copyrighted song, 
YouTube runs advertisements on the page and prompts the viewer to 
purchase the song or ringtone..316  The revenue generated from the 
sale of these advertisements would be shared with the rightsholders.317 
Thus, while copyright law is stuck in developmental limbo, 
technology will continue to advance and the problems facing 
 
 309  Brad Stone & Brooks Barnes, MGM to Post Full Films On YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10mgm.html? 
_r=1&adxnnl=1&ref=technology&adxnnlx=1328988115-julDs/TSo3TMHdH+AtZ0cg. 
 310  Id. 
 311  Id. 
 312  Id. 
 313  Tim Arango, As Rights Clash on YouTube, Some Music Vanishes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/business/media/23warner.html. 
 314  See Claire Cain Miller, YouTube Ads Turn Videos Into Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
3, 2010, at B1.  
 315  Id. 
 316  Id. 
 317  Id. 
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rightsholders and users will grow exponentially more complex.  As a 
practical matter, this deadlock must be resolved.  Here, as in the 
YouTube case, the service provider is protected by the DMCA, absent 
any actual knowledge of specific infringing content.318  Additionally, 
the court notes that YouTube’s Content ID systems are effective in 
identifying and then potentially removing infringing content;319 
however, this system does not truly leave room for fair use of 
copyrighted content.  In Viacom v. YouTube, the Second Circuit 
emphasized that Congress placed the burden on the rightsholder to 
determine whether material was infringing.320  When choosing among 
the rightsholder, the user, and the service provider to decide who 
should make this fair use determination, it makes sense to place the 
burden on the rightsholder, who possesses the most information 
about the content. 
In the YouTube context, however, this can be a problematic 
approach.  First, this process gives the rightsholders a large amount 
of power to make their own determinations.  While rightsholders 
ideally make these determinations, there is no check by a third party.  
Essentially, the rightsholders seem to be able to make their own rules.  
Second, YouTube’s approach creates inconsistencies.  For example, 
one record label may decide to send a takedown notice to users 
whose videos contain more than ten seconds of a copyrighted song, 
while another could have YouTube issue takedown notices to users 
using more than sixty seconds of protected content.  Therefore, the 
users are unable to predict what may be taken down, what is 
permissible, and cannot necessarily expect YouTube to treat the same 
length or type of content consistently. 
C. Towards a Music and Video Rights Registry? 
If the parties engage in future litigation, a settlement of that 
litigation could stipulate to a Music and Video Rights Registry 
(MVRR) that determines “fair use” solely in the YouTube context.  
Clearly, because an independent registry would have no law-making 
power, the determinations made by the committee would not be 
binding in any other context.  The MVRR, however, could provide 
guidelines for users to establish some norms and expectations for 
both the users and the rightsholders.  The MVRR’s determinations 
 
 318  Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
see supra Part IV.A. 
 319  YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
 320  Id. at 523. 
MCSKIMMING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/12/2012  3:00 PM 
1780 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1745 
 
would be influenced by case law but adapted for use on the site.  This 
provides consistent standards and removes the initial fair use 
determination from the hands of the rightsholders.  Moreover, like 
the Google Books Rights Registry, the MVRR would seat a board of 
directors comprised of rightsholders in the music, television, and 
movie industries.  Inclusion of artists, however, would be important as 
well.  While determinations of brightline rules would certainly 
provoke disagreements, the goal would simply be to set ground rules 
in this one discrete context with potential for compromise.  For 
example, parties might stipulate that up to sixty seconds of 
copyrighted material is permissible.  Any use of more than sixty 
seconds may be flagged for review by the MVRR, if the user believes 
his video is still permissible fair use. 
YouTube’s process would remain similar to the current 
procedures, but the MVRR would play an active role.  Audio ID and 
Video ID would still be used and would still be vital to the process 
because they would initially identify the copyrighted content.  
Rightsholders would still have the option of establishing certain 
procedures that YouTube would have to follow if videos using 
copyrighted content were flagged.  Examples of such procedures 
include leaving the videos online, tracking how many times the video 
is viewed, or using the videos to earn revenue through advertising.  
Rightsholders could not create their own bright-line rules requiring 
YouTube to send takedown notices to users of copyrighted content—
for example, rightsholders could not require YouTube to send 
takedown notices to users whose video includes thirty seconds or 
more of a protected song; videos would not be automatically 
removed. YouTube would notify individuals that their videos were 
potentially infringing a copyright and, instead of going to court, users 
would submit their video to the MVRR for review.  This would allow 
users who believed they had a legitimate fair use defense to avoid the 
risk of being sued by a rightsholder.  These rightsholders most likely 
have greater financial resources and time to pursue claims than the 
average user.  Thus, submission to the MVRR would not expose the 
user to suit and would not deter claims of legitimate fair use. 
The second major function of the MVRR would be to facilitate 
the sale of licenses for music and video use.  If the MVRR determines 
that the content does violate copyright law, then the MVRR would 
give the user an option to purchase a license from the rightsholder to 
allow the user to keep the content on the site and to use the 
copyrighted material.  The license could be a flat fee for use of any 
portion of a song, or the MVRR could charge a fee based on the 
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portion of the song used.  Finally, if the user refuses to purchase a 
license, then the video would be taken down. 
Major obstacles to the workability of this project are evident.  
The primary concern would be financing the MVRR’s operations.  
The Google Book Rights Registry would be funded by Google’s initial 
contribution321 and then sustained by the revenue Google receives.322  
Although a part of the giant Google corporation, YouTube itself has 
not been profitable.323  This year, however, it is projected to earn $1.7 
billion dollars.324  While the MVRR might not be plausible currently, if 
YouTube revenues continue to increase, then YouTube may be able 
to make an initial contribution to establish the MVRR and sustain it.  
If YouTube can sell advertising on the site that is displayed with the 
copyrighted material, then the proceeds could be used to fund the 
MVRR.  Another major concern is the unmanageable nature of the 
MVRR’s task, as the sheer number of videos posted on the site is 
massive.  A great amount of manpower would be required to view 
content and make determinations.  After some specific rules were 
decided upon by the board of directors, however, the determinations 
of fair use might be easier, because fewer videos would have to be 
reviewed. 
The logistical obstacles to establishing the MVRR are great, but 
still not as problematic as those that are preventing copyright reform.  
Although idealistic and aspirational, the existence of a body like the 
MVRR may be more plausible than actual changes in the copyright 
law.  Creating the parameters for use of copyrighted content on 
YouTube may influence the public’s understanding and use of 
copyrighted content.  This may even develop a greater consensus in 
the public opinion about what is and is not permissible use.  
Establishing a working definition of fair use may even be the impetus 
for legal reform. 
 
 321  FAQs, supra note 158. 
 322  HOWE, supra note 171. 
 323  Anthony John Agnello, How Google Will Finally Make YouTube Profitable, 
INVESTORPLACE (Sept. 16, 2011, 1:04 AM), 
http://www.investorplace.com/2011/09/google-youtube-goog-video-editing-netflix/.  
Google’s co-founder and CEO, Larry Page, believes that YouTube requires more 
investment to be profitable.  Claire Cain Miller, Google Results Show Growing Strength, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at B1.  
 324  Erick Schonfeld, Citi: Google’s YouTube Revenues Will Pass $1 Billion in 2012 (And 
So Could Local), TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://techcrunch.com/2011/03/21/citi-google-local-youtube-1-billion/.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The Google Books project digitized the massive libraries of many 
research universities.  Google scanned these books without the 
publishers’ or authors’ consent and posted snippets of these books 
on the Internet, returning them as search results of Google queries.  
In the wake of the unilateral scanning, rightsholders brought suit 
against Google for copyright infringement in the Southern District of 
New York.  The court did not decide the merits of the case, as the 
parties reached a settlement that, although rejected by the court in 
total, has a meritorious provision.  As part of the agreement, Google 
was to create a Book Rights Registry to act as an intermediary 
between rightsholders and Google itself.  The Registry would have 
facilitated copyright claims and administer payment to the 
rightholders. 
In a related copyright matter, Viacom sued YouTube for 
permitting infringing content on its website.  Viacom complained 
that users uploaded copyrighted videos, allowing the public to view 
them without the rightsholders’ consent, in violation of copyright 
law.  The Southern District of New York held that YouTube was 
protected under the notice and take-down statutory safe harbor, 
which grants protection from liability if an Internet intermediary has 
procedures in place by which it effectively removes infringing content 
at a rightsholder’s request.  Fair use complicates the matter.  
Copyrighted material can be used in specific circumstances that are 
enumerated by the Copyright Act.  In its mechanistic take-down of 
copyrighted content, no fair use determination is made. 
In light of the current state of copyright law, including the fair 
use exception and the DMCA, a provision of the Google Books 
Settlement may provide a solution to the clash between the law and 
the digital world.  It may serve as a useful model for the future 
resolution of copyright infringement in the YouTube context, 
especially in light of prior mass tort settlements.  YouTube’s current 
methods regarding copyrighted work do not adequately address the 
question of fair use.  To address this problem, an analog to the Book 
Rights Registry, created by settlement of potential future litigation, 
may be able to set basic principles for what is an acceptable use of 
copyrighted content on the site.  While not truly resolving the legal 
definition of fair use and facing great logistical difficulties, a MVRR 
would standardize the rules in this context, providing guidance to 
users and rightsholders without stifling legitimate expression. 
 
